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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting
rules, k−Plurality, k−Negative Plurality, k−Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered
as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison
is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency which is defined as the conditional
probability that a given voting rule picks out the Condorcet committee, given that such
a committee exists. The second comparison is based on the likelihood of two paradoxes
of committee elections: The Prior Successor Paradox and the Leaving Member Paradox
which occur when a member of an elected committee leaves. In doing so, using the
well-known Impartial Anonymous Culture condition, we extend the results of Kamwa
and Merlin (2015) in two directions. First, our paper is concerned with the probability
of the paradoxes no matter the ranking of the leaving candidate. Second, we do not
only focus on the occurrence of these paradoxes when one wishes to select a committee
of size k = 2 out of m = 4 candidates but we consider more values of k and m.
Keywords: Multi-winner voting rules, committee, Condorcet committee efficiency,
paradoxes, probability.
JEL classification: D71, D72
1 Introduction
Many representative bodies in reality require the selection of a specific number of
candidates (committee) instead of a single member. As for single-winner elections, there
are several different ways of finding the winning committee that, in some sense, best
represent all the voters. Multi-winner procedures map the preferences of the voters to
subsets of candidates, and effectively specify the composition of the committee. In this
setting, we need first to describe how a voter can translate his/her preference into a vote.
Two main approaches are considered in the literature. In the first one, the voters have
preferences over committees that satisfy certain conditions as in Fishburn (1981). In the
second one, the voters are assumed to possess rankings over the candidates as single
members as in Gehrlein (1985b). Whatever the case, the study of the characteristics and
properties of multi-winner voting methods has received increasing interest in the recent
literature of Social Choice Theory.
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Similarly to the second setting, we consider in this paper that voters have preferences over
candidates. More precisely, we assume that the voters’ preferences are described by linear
rankings of the set of candidates, i.e. the indifferences are not allowed. The purpose of this
work is to study four multi-winner voting rules which can be considered as generalisations
of well-known single-winner scoring rules: k−Plurality, k−Negative Plurality, k−Borda,
and Bloc. Here, each candidate gets some points from each voter according to his/her
position in the voter’s preference, and in the case where the committee must be of size k,
the candidates with the k highest aggregate scores are elected.
First, we focus on the ability of each multi-winner rule to select the Condorcet committee
à la Gehrlein (Gehrlein, 1985b). This is considered as the most important extension of
Condorcet principle (Condorcet, 1785) to the k−winner context, when it is assumed that
voters provide their preferences over candidates. The Condorcet principle considers that if
a candidate beats all other candidates in pairwise majority comparisons, called Condorcet
winner, then this candidate should be chosen. In this sense, Gehrlein (1985b) defined a
Condorcet committee as a set of k candidates such that each element of this committee
defeats every candidate which does not belong to it in pairwise majority comparisons,
whenever such committee exists. Consequently, we use this framework for evaluating the
Condorcet committee efficiency (CCE) of each voting procedure, which is defined as the
conditional probability that this procedure selects the Condorcet committee, given that a
Condorcet committee exists.
There is a large literature devoted exclusively to the Condorcet efficiency of single-winner1
voting methods under various assumptions. The reader is referred to Cervone et al. (2005),
Diss and Gehrlein (2015), Diss et al. (2010), Fishburn (1974a,b), Fishburn and Gehrlein
(1976a,b, 1977), Gehrlein (1985a, 1995, 1999), Gehrlein and Lepelley (1999, 2001, 2015),
Lepelley et al. (2000b), Merrill (1984, 1985), among others. A detailed survey of early
research on the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules can be found in the recent book of
Gehrlein and Lepelley (2010). However, it is striking how very little attention has been
paid to the CCE. In our knowledge, the only paper concerned with such a question is
the one of Gehrlein (1985b). For a number of candidates m in {3, 4, 5, 6}, this paper is
concerned with the probability that a Condorcet committee exists, and the CCE of various
constant scoring rules using exclusively Monte-Carlo simulations in the spirit of the
well-known Impartial Culture assumption (defined later). Under a constant scoring rule,
each voter shall be able to vote for a given number of candidates and the k elected members
of the committee are the k candidates receiving the most votes2. Throughout our paper, for
a number of candidatesm in {3, 4, 5, 6}, we extend the previous work to more multi-winner
voting rules and other contexts described later. This defines the first purpose of our paper.
Second, this study also investigates a comparison of the multi-winner rules considered
in this paper on the basis of the probability that some voting paradoxes will be observed
in committee elections, if a member of an elected committee leaves the competition.
Two paradoxes are considered: The Prior Successor Paradox (PSP) as defined in Kamwa
and Merlin (2015) and the Leaving Member Paradox (LMP) which is defined in Staring
(1986) and also considered in Kamwa and Merlin (2015). Similarly to our paper, Staring
1The Condorcet efficiency of a single-winner voting rule is the conditional probability that this given voting
rule picks out the Condorcet winner, given that such a candidate exists.
2To be more exact, Gehrlein (1985b) provided the probability that a Condorcet committee exists for m in
{3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, and the CCE of various constant scoring rules for m in {3, 4, 5, 6}.
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(1986) considered n voters and m candidates for which the election procedure selects a
k committee members with the k greatest scores. If an elected member of a committee
leaves the competition for some reason, the LMP occurs if, by holding a new election over
the m − 1 remaining candidates, the new committee and the original one are disjoint. In
other words, committee members under the new election scenario are chosen, while no
candidate was considered from the committee of the original election over m candidates.
Kamwa and Merlin (2015) defined the PSP which is less severe than the LMP. Since the
elected committee members are those with the k greatest scores, the authors defined the
Prior Successor as the candidate with the k + 1th best score. Following this definition, the
PSP occurs if after a member of the elected committee leaves, a new election results in a
committee containing all the k − 1 members of the original committee without the prior
successor.
In spite of the importance of committee selection, there have been few studies of the
occurrence of these two paradoxes under the voting schemes involved. Exceptions are
Kamwa and Merlin (2015), and Staring (1986). By only examples, Staring (1986) showed
that committee elections can lead to disturbingly paradoxical events similar to the LMP3 .
In particular, Staring (1986) considered that the election procedure asks each voter to vote
for their k most preferred candidates. Kamwa and Merlin (2015) examined the probability
of the PSP and the LMP with the same four multi-winner voting rules that we consider in
this paper under the IC condition when the election is concerned with a committee of k = 2
out of m = 4 candidates. Using the IAC condition (defined later), we enrich the results of
Kamwa and Merlin (2015) in many directions. In contrast with Kamwa and Merlin (2015),
our paper is concerned with the probability of the two paradoxes no matter the ranking
of the leaving candidate which seems to be the natural way of considering this question.
Moreover, we consider more possibilities for k andm. This summarizes the second purpose
of our study.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic terminology
including individual preferences and multi-winner voting rules, Section 3 states and
provides the CCE of each multi-winner voting rule, Section 4 discusses the probability
of the PSP and the LMP for each voting rule, and Section 5 makes some comments and
conclusions.
2 Preliminary definitions
Before describing the voting procedures under investigation, an outline of the context,
notations and assumptions is in order. Throughout the paper, we will consider the
3In addition to the LMP, the other paradox described by Staring (1986) in his original paper is the Increasing
Committee Size Paradox (ICSP) which occurs if, by increasing the target size k, we can find that the candidates
that are elected in the committees change for each k. Under some conditions, both committees may be totally
disjoint. Notice that, for the constant scoring rule as voters cast votes for their k most preferred candidates,
Kamwa (2013) provided the probability of the ICSP when the size of a committee increases from 1 to 2 in three-
candidate elections under the IAC condition as a function of the number of voters. Mitchell and Trumbull (1992)
considered slightly more general voting methods: To select the k members of the committee, each voter cast
votes for their k∗ most preferred candidates. Two particular paradoxes are then considered using Monte-Carlo
simulations under different assumptions, including the IC hypothesis. The first paradox is a version of the
ICSP in which a candidate is elected under a vote for k∗ candidates procedure, and then that candidate is not
elected for larger values of k∗. The second paradox considered in Mitchell and Trumbull (1992) occurs when
the Condorcet winner is not selected among the k members of the committee.
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framework of elections which can be defined by a pair (X,V ), where X = {x1, . . . , xm} is
a set of candidates (or alternatives) and V = {1, . . . , n} is a set of voters. A linear order
on X is a transitive, antisymmetric, and total relation on X. Each voter is assumed to
have a linear order on the set of candidates from the most desirable candidate to the
least desirable one. In addition, each voter is assumed to act according to his/her true
preferences. In this context, a profile is a sequence of n total orders over m candidates and
a voting situation is defined by the vector n˜ = (n1, n2, . . . , nm!), where in parenthesis, we
refer the number of voters endowed with each of the m! orders such that
∑m!
i=1 ni = n. For
instance, in the case of three candidates in X = {x1, x2, x3}, there exist six possible linear
orders: x1x2x3 (n1), x1x3x2 (n2), x2x1x3 (n3), x2x3x1 (n4), x3x1x2 (n5), and x3x2x1 (n6).
The notation x1x2x3 means that voters have candidate x1 as most preferred, candidate
x3 as least preferred, and candidate x2 as middle-ranked and we give in parenthesis the
number n1 of voters endowed with this order. In this setting, a voting situation is a vector
n˜ = (n1, . . . , n6) such that
∑6
i=1 ni = n.
Given two candidates x1 and x2, we denote x1Mx2 to say that candidate x1 beats candidate
x2 in a pairwise election which occurs when a strict majority of voters prefer x1 to x2.
A candidate is said to be a Condorcet winner if he/she wins in all of his/her pairwise
elections. For instance, using our notations above for the case of three candidates, x1 is a
Condorcet winner if x1Mx2 and x1Mx3. This is equivalent to n1 +n2 +n5 > n3 +n4 +n6 and
n1 + n2 + n3 > n4 + n5 + n6, respectively. Clearly, each election has at most one Condorcet
winner, but many elections have no Condorcet winners.
In our framework, we consider settings where the voters’ goal is to elect a committee of size
k and we denote by C the set of all subsets of X. We can now formally define the notion of
Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein4 (Gehrlein, 1985b).
Definition 1 (Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein)
A set C ⊂ C is a Condorcet committee if xiMxj for every alternative xi ∈ C and every
alternative xj ∈ X \ C.
A multi-winner voting rule maps the preferences of all voters V = {1, . . . , n} to a subset
C ⊂ C, which consequently specifies the composition of the committee. We examine four
multi-winner voting rules. The reason of considering these multi-winner voting rules is
due to the fact that they are based on the general scoring protocol. A scoring rule can be
expressed by a sequence of real numbers s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) such that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ sm
and s1 > sm. Each of the n voters ranks the candidates assigning s1 points to the one ranked
first, s2 points to the one ranked second, and so on until sm, the number of points assigned
to the candidate ranked last. Predictably, the candidate that accumulated the most points,
summed over all voters, wins the election. Since we consider settings where the voters’ goal
is to elect a committee of size k, it is natural to select the k candidates with the highest
scores. Given these definitions, we are ready to describe the multi-winner voting rules that
we focus on in our paper.
k-Plurality: under k−Plurality5, we select the k candidates with the highest Plurality
scores such that each voter has one vote which he/she can cast for any one of the m
candidates, i.e. s = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
4Also called weak Condorcet committee (Kaymak and Sanver, 2003) and Condorcet k−Committee or
Condorcet k−Set (Pérez et al., 2012).
5Also called Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV).
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k-Borda: under k−Borda, we select the candidates with the k highest Borda scores such
that each first-place vote is worthm− 1 points, each second-place vote is worthm− 2
points, and so on until 0 point to each last-place vote, i.e. s = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0).
k-Negative Plurality: under k−Negative Plurality, we return the candidates with the
k highest Negative Plurality (also called Anti-Plurality or Veto) scores such that each
voter assigns one point for any one of the m − 1 best ranked candidates, i.e. s =
(1, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
Bloc: under Bloc6, we choose the candidates with the k highest k−approval scores in the
winning committee. k−approval rule is a variation of the well-known Approval Voting
rule7 obtained by fixing the number k of candidates that has to be approved of by each
voter. In other terms, the score of a candidate xi is the number of voters that rank xi
among the top k positions in a profile of strict preferences, i.e. s = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, 0, . . . , 0)8.
Given two candidates x1 and x2, we denote x1Sx2 to say that candidate x1 beats candidate
x2 when the multi-winner scoring rule S is used. For instance, using our notations above
for the case of three candidates and considering S = k−Plurality, the event x1Sx2 occurs
when the k−Plurality score of x1 is greater than the one of x2, which is equivalent to
n1 + n2 > n3 + n4.
Debord (1993) extended the Young (1975)’s characterization of Borda to the case of
k−Borda and introduced new axioms for multi-winner rules. Elkind et al. (2015) reviewed
some multi-winner voting rules and proposed a set of natural properties against which
these voting rules can be judged. Among these rules, Elkind et al. (2015) are concerned
with k−Plurality, k−Borda, and Bloc. Felsenthal and Maoz (1992) took into account some
normative properties of four k−winner electoral procedures based on scoring protocols,
such as k−Plurality rule and k−Borda rule.
To find our probabilities, we need to assume a probability distribution that underlies
our calculations. The most common assumption is that preferences follow a uniform
distribution. In this paper, the probabilities that we investigate are driven by the well-
known Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) condition (Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976) which
assumes that all voting situations n˜ = (n1, n2, . . . , nm!) for a specified number of voters n
are equally likely to be observed. This assumption is one of the most used probabilistic
models in the literature. The reader is referred to Gehrlein and Lepelley (2012) for a
detailed discussion of this assumption and some others such that the Impartial Culture (IC)
condition9. Gehrlein and Lepelley (2012) clarified the value of the research that is based
on these simple assumptions. More precisely, the authors claimed that these conditions
6Also called Limited Voting (Kamwa and Merlin, 2015) or Constant Scoring Rule (Gehrlein, 1985b).
7Approval voting (AV) is a voting procedure in which voters may vote for as many candidates as they wish. It
asks each voter to distinguish the candidates she approves of from the ones she considers as unacceptable. The
alternative with the highest degree of approbation is then selected. The proponents of this voting procedure
(e.g. Brams (1980), Brams and Fishburn (1978, 2005), and Fishburn and Brams (1981)) discussed several
advantages that it has over other electoral systems.
8Bloc is equivalent to k−Plurality and k−Negative Plurality when k = 1 and k = m− 1, respectively.
9IC is a second well-known model which considers the set of all preference profiles as a sample space where
a voter preference profile identifies the specific preference ranking that each voter has on the candidates. In
other terms, when strict preferences over the set of m candidates are assumed, the IC assumption (Guilbaud,
1952) assumes that each voter is equally likely to pick any of them! preferences. Notice that individual voter’s
preferences are not anonymous under IC condition while they are under IAC assumption.
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add very significant value to research on the probability that various paradoxical election
outcomes might be observed. For a comprehensive survey of various probability models
used in Social Choice Theory, the reader is referred to Berg and Lepelley (1994), or the
recent book of Gehrlein and Lepelley (2010).
3 The Condorcet committee efficiency
We are now interested in the following question: Which rule has the greatest CCE?
As noted in the Introduction, this question has attracted very few consideration in the
literature. To the best of our knowledge, Gehrlein (1985b) is the only author who explored
such framework that we extend in three main directions. First, we are concerned withmore
multi-winner voting rules. Second, we can provide exact results of both, the probability
that a Condorcet committee exists, and the CCE when the number of candidates m equal
to 3 and 4. For m equal to 5 and 6, one problem is that the number of constraints can be
prohibitively large, so that in this case we will instead run Monte-Carlo simulations10.
Third, we consider the IAC condition to describe the likelihood of the possible individual
orderings.
It is clear that, in order to provide the CCE of each voting rule, we first need to determine
the probability that a Condorcet committee (à la Gehrlein) exists.
3.1 The probability that a Condorcet committee exists
We begin this section by providing a general insight into the technique used in this paper
in order to calculate each limiting probability under IAC condition as n→∞ for the cases
ofm = 3 andm = 4. In this framework, we will see that this technique is simply reduced to
computation of volumes of convex polytopes. For this, we give a simple example withm = 3
and k = 2. The detail of the other calculations are available upon simple request from the
authors. We begin by re-adapting our definition of a voting situation to the limiting case as
n→∞. Let pi = nin ≥ 0 denote the proportion of the n voters with the associated ith linear
ordering for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6 in a given election with a large electorates. In other words, there
exist six possible linear orders: x1x2x3 (p1), x1x3x2 (p2), x2x1x3 (p3), x2x3x1 (p4), x3x1x2 (p5),
and x3x2x1 (p6). Any voting situation is completely specified by a six-dimensional vector
p˜ = (p1, . . . , p6) such that
∑6
i=1 pi = 1. Similarly, the IAC condition, henceforth referred to
as IAC∞, is equivalent to assuming that all possible p˜ are equally likely to be observed. It
is clear that all the possible voting situations p˜ are included in the convex polytope defined
by the following six vertices:
v11 = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] v
1
2 = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0] v
1
3 = [0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
v14 = [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0] v
1
5 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0] v
1
6 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]
(1)
This region corresponds to a five-dimensional simplex ∆5. The first objective is to find the
volume of this region. Several methods or algorithms can be found for volume computations
of polytopes. The reader is referred to Bueler et al. (2000), Cervone et al. (2005), Cohen and
Hickey (1979), Lawrence (1991), or Lepelley et al. (2008). Details of the procedure used for
our calculations are not included in the current paper, and we only present an outline of
10We can also generate simulations with more than six candidates. However, this option is ignored since
these simulations can not affect the conclusions of our paper.
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how the results are obtained11. Using the same general procedure that was implemented
in Cervone et al. (2005), we can obtain the volume of this space which is also provided in
Diss and Gehrlein (2012, 2015):
V olume(IAC,m = 3) =
√
6
120
. (2)
Notice that for m = 4, any voting situation n˜ = (n1, . . . , n24) will be rewritten as p˜ =
(p1, . . . , p24) such that
∑24
i=1 pi = 1. The set of all voting situations p˜ is then 23-dimensional.
For this region, we obtain the following volume:
V olume(IAC,m = 4) =
√
6
12926008369442488320000
. (3)
According to Definition 1, a set C ⊂ C is a Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein if xiMxj for
every alternative xi in C and every alternative xj in X \C. Withm = 3 and k = 2, suppose
without loss of generality that the committee is C = {x1, x2}. Then, C is a Condorcet
committee if both x1 and x2 defeat x3 head-to-head. In other terms, we need the following
conditions: p1+p2+p3 > p4+p5+p6 (x1Mx3) and p1+p3+p4 > p2+p5+p6 (x2Mx3). Thus, our
objective is to obtain the polytope included in ∆5 for which the two inequalities are fulfilled.
The procedure of obtaining the required polytope is recursive. More precisely, since each
polytope is defined by its vertices, on each step the polytope obtained on the previous step is
cut with the next hyperplane and its vertices are determined. LetH1 denote the hyperplane
defined from the first inequality above such that:
H1 : p1 + p2 + p3 − p4 − p5 − p6 = 0 (4)
Thus, when the first inequality is taken into consideration, the original five-dimensional
simplex ∆5 given in (1) is cut by H1 into two convex polytopes, the one for which x1Mx3
(p1 +p2 +p3−p4−p5−p6 > 0 and the other for which x3Mx1 (p1 +p2 +p3−p4−p5−p6 < 0).
This second polytope is discarded along with all vertices that are included in it. After this
first slice, the vertices of the new polytope include all vertices of ∆5 that are above or on the
hyperplaneH1 plus the new vertices that appear when an edge of ∆5 (formed by one vertex
above and one below the hyperplaneH1) is sliced byH1. We can determine the vertices that
remain within the region and all of the new vertices that are created after this first slice.
These vertices are:
v21 = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] v
2
2 = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0] v
2
3 = [0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
v24 = [
1
2 , 0, 0, 0, 0,
1
2 ] v
2
5 = [0,
1
2 , 0, 0, 0,
1
2 ] v
2
6 = [0, 0,
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2 ]
v27 = [
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2 , 0, 0] v
2
8 = [0,
1
2 , 0,
1
2 , 0, 0] v
2
9 = [0, 0,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0]
v210 = [
1
2 , 0, 0, 0,
1
2 , 0] v
2
11 = [0,
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2 , 0] v
2
12 = [0, 0,
1
2 , 0,
1
2 , 0]
Thus, when the second inequality (x2Mx3: p1 − p2 + p3 + p4 − p5 − p6 > 0) is taken into
consideration, the new polytope is similarly defined by the following vertices:
v31 = [0,
1
2 , 0,
1
2 , 0, 0] v
3
2 = [
1
2 , 0, 0, 0, 0,
1
2 ] v
3
3 = [0, 0,
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2 ]
v34 = [
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2 , 0, 0] v
3
5 = [0, 0,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0] v
3
6 = [
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0, 0, 0]
v37 = [0,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0, 0] v
3
8 = [
1
2 , 0, 0, 0,
1
2 , 0] v
3
9 = [0, 0,
1
2 , 0,
1
2 , 0]
v310 = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] v
3
11 = [0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
(5)
11Our volumes are found with the use of the algorithm implemented in Gawrilow and Joswig (2000).
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Having our final polytope, the next step is to calculate its volume. We obtain the following
result:
Volume1 =
√
6
384
. (6)
Using the symmetry of IAC with respect to the three candidates, it then follows from (2)
and (6) that the probability for which a Condorcet committee of size 2 exists in the case of
3 candidates with IAC and large electorates (denoted PCCIAC∞(2, 3)), is given by:
PCCIAC∞(2, 3) =
3× Volume1
Volume(IAC,m = 3) =
15
16
= 0.9375. (7)
This method is used to find all our probabilities in the case ofm = 3 andm = 4. However, it
turns impossible to obtain results in an acceptable time form = 5 andm = 6. Consequently,
to circumvent the impossibility of having exact results12, we perform a computer simulation
to estimate these probabilities using the Monte-Carlo simulation methodology in the spirit
of the IAC assumption. More exactly, we take into consideration a number of voters n =
100, 000 and we run 100, 000 elections to guarantee our results with a very law margin of
error. Computed values of PCCIAC∞(k,m) are listed in Table 1 for the values of m and k
considered in this paper.
Table 1: PCCIAC∞(k,m)
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.9375 0.8384 0.7470 0.6774
2 0.9375 0.7598 0.6120 0.4830
3 – 0.8384 0.6020 0.4260
4 – – 0.7525 0.4935
5 – – – 0.6828
The probability PCCIAC∞(1, 3) = 0.9375 is the well-known result given in Gehrlein and
Fishburn (1976) that a Condorcet winner exists under IAC for m = 3 and n → ∞. The
precise limiting probability PCCIAC∞(1, 4) = 0.8384 is similar to the one given in Gehrlein
(2001). Going deeper in these probabilities, we can deduce the following facts:
• It becomes very apparent that an important result can be observed: CCIAC∞ (k,m) =
CCIAC∞ (m− k,m). This general result is also given in Gehrlein (1985b) under IC and
remains true in our context of IAC. Notice that this result has a specific interpretation
when k = 1 which is well-known from the literature: The probability that a Condorcet
winner exists is identical to the probability that a Condorcet loser exists13.
• As well as k increases, the probability for which a Condorcet committee exists first
decreases and then increases.
• The results in Table 1 contain some information that allows us to check the margin of
error of our simulation method for m = 5 and m = 6. Indeed, our results guarantee
a maximum error of about 0.01 which corresponds to CCIAC∞ (4, 6) − CCIAC∞ (2, 6) =
0.4935− 0.4830 = 0.0105.
12The only volume that we can provide in an acceptable time is the one related to the 119-dimensional region
which defines all voting situations p˜ in the case of m = 5: V olume(IAC,m = 5) = 1.965069984× 10−196.
13A Condorcet loser is a candidate that loses all head-to-head comparisons with other candidates.
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3.2 The Condorcet committee efficiency of simple voting rules
Recall that, we suppose in our illustrative example thatX = {x1, x2, x3} and that the elected
committee is C = {x1, x2}. Then, C should be the winner when we consider a voting rule S,
i.e. x1Sx3 and x2Sx3. Let consider that S is equivalent to k-Plurality rule. Therefore, the
inequalities p1 +p2 > p5 +p6 (x1Sx3) and p3 +p4 > p5 +p6 (x2Sx3) should be satisfied. Thus,
when the first inequality is taken into consideration, the final polytope defined in (5) is
discarded along with all vertices that are included in it. After this first slice the vertices of
the new polytope are found. Thus, when the last inequality is taken into consideration, our
final polytope, where the set C = {x1, x2} is the Condorcet committee and also the winner
of k−Plurality, is defined by the following vertices:
v41 = [0, 0,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0] v
4
2 = [0,
1
2 , 0,
1
2 , 0, 0] v
4
3 = [0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
v44 = [
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0, 0, 0] v
4
5 = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] v
4
6 = [0,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 , 0,
1
4 ]
v47 = [
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 , 0,
1
3 ] v
4
8 = [
1
3 , 0,
1
6 ,
1
6 , 0,
1
3 ] v
4
9 = [
1
4 ,
1
4 , 0,
1
4 , 0,
1
4 ]
v410 = [
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
4 , 0,
1
4 ] v
4
11 = [0,
1
4 ,
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
4 ] v
4
12 = [
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
3 , 0, 0,
1
3 ]
v413 = [
1
3 , 0,
1
3 , 0, 0,
1
3 ] v
4
14 = [
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2 , 0, 0] v
4
15 = [0,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0, 0]
v416 = [0,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 , 0] v
4
17 = [
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
3 , 0] v
4
18 = [
1
3 , 0,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
3 , 0]
v419 = [
1
4 ,
1
4 , 0,
1
4 ,
1
4 , 0] v
4
20 = [
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
4 ,
1
4 , 0] v
4
21 = [0,
1
4 ,
1
2 , 0,
1
4 , 0]
v422 = [
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
3 , 0,
1
3 , 0] v
4
23 = [
1
3 , 0,
1
3 , 0,
1
3 , 0]
The volume associated to the polytope defined by these vertices is given by:
Volume2 =
17×√6
10368
. (8)
We conclude that the Condorcet committee efficiency of k−Plurality for k = 2 and m = 3
under the IAC condition and large electorates (denoted CCEk−PIAC∞(2, 3)), is given by:
CCEk−PIAC∞(2, 3) =
Volume2
Volume1
= 0.6296. (9)
Tables 2-5 display the values of CCEk−PIAC∞(k,m), CCE
k−NP
IAC∞ (k,m), CCE
k−B
IAC∞(k,m),
and CCEBIAC∞(k,m), the CCE of k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc,
respectively. Again, while the values for m = 3 and m = 4 are all exact probabilities,
the ones for m = 5 and m = 6 are based on computer simulations.
Table 2: CCEk−PIAC∞(k,m)
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.8815 0.7426 0.6143 0.5207
2 0.6296 0.5427 0.4476 0.3638
3 – 0.5516 0.4199 0.3380
4 – – 0.5100 0.3322
5 – – – 0.4701
Table 3: CCEk−NPIAC∞ (k,m)
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.6296 0.5516 0.5104 0.4696
2 0.8815 0.5427 0.4267 0.3529
3 – 0.7426 0.4521 0.3211
4 – – 0.6140 0.3642
5 – – – 0.5183
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Table 4: CCEk−BIAC∞(k,m)
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.9111 0.8706 0.8580 0.8457
2 0.9111 0.8598 0.8286 0.8234
3 – 0.8706 0.8348 0.8172
4 – – 0.8587 0.8372
5 – – – 0.8477
Table 5: CCEBIAC∞(k,m)
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.8815 0.7426 0.6143 0.5207
2 0.8815 0.7468 0.6210 0.5386
3 – 0.7426 0.6337 0.5715
4 – – 0.6140 0.5330
5 – – – 0.5183
We can deduce the following facts from these probabilities:
• An immediate consequence of these tables is that our calculations are consistent with
previous results in the literature when k = 1. For instance, for m between 3 and
8, Lepelley et al. (2000a) considered the Condorcet efficiency of Plurality, Negative
Plurality and Borda for the asymptotic case using Monte-Carlo simulations. For
instance, under IAC, the Condorcet efficiency estimates for Plurality are 0.8816,
0.7429, 0.6139, and 0.5198 for m equal to 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively while our results
provide 0.8815, 0.7426, 0.6143, and 0.5207. Our results show a small difference in
comparison with those provided in Lepelley et al. (2000a) for each voting rule. For
m = 3 and k = 1, our results for Borda, Plurality, and Negative Plurality are
consistent with previous exact results in Cervone et al. (2005).
• It is obvious from these tables that, for a given k, the CCE decreases as m increases.
Moreover, for a given m, we observe that the CCE of k−Negative Plurality,
k−Plurality, and k−Borda exhibit the same behaviour, i.e. it first decreases and then
increases as k increases. However, this conclusion is not the same for Bloc since its
CCE first decreases and then increases as k increases.
• k−Borda performs better than the three other voting rules and k−Negative Plurality
is the worst scenario. Moreover, for a given m, the CCE of k−Borda varies much
more slowly than the three other rules and remains at a relatively high level when
k changes. For instance, for m = 6, the probability under k−Borda varies between
0.8172 for k = 3 and 0.8477 for k = 5 while the corresponding one of k−Plurality ranges
between 0.3322 for k = 4 and 0.5207 for k = 1.
• Some of the relationships which were developed in Gehrlein (1985b) under IC can be
generalized to IAC. In particular, CCEk−PIAC∞(k,m) is the same as CCE
k−NP
IAC∞ (m−k,m).
Moreover, for Bloc we have CCEBIAC∞(k,m) = CCE
B
IAC∞(m − k,m). Notice that the
paper of Gehrlein (1985b) is not concerned in k−Borda for which we found that the
CCE exhibits the same behaviour as Bloc.
4 Two paradoxes with simple voting rules
As already mentioned, this paper also extends the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2015)
and discusses the probability of two paradoxes that manifested themselves in a particular
context: The election of committees when a member of an elected committee leaves. We
are interested in the following question: Which multi-winner voting rule has the smallest
probability of each paradox?
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4.1 The context
Consider an election in which a committee C = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} of size k out ofm candidates
is elected. Recall that, in our framework, the set C is composed by the k candidates with
the k greatest scores which means that xiSxj for each xi ∈ C and each element xj /∈ C.
Suppose that a candidate xl is the (k + 1)th ranked candidate, called the Prior Successor,
which happens if xlSxj for each xj /∈ C with xl 6= xj . Then, without loss of generality,
suppose that candidate x1 ∈ C must immediately drop out of office for some reason and
that there is no provision of substitutes. It seems very reasonable to simply nominate
candidate xl to the committee in order to replace x1 since xl was ranked (k + 1)th in total
votes received by each candidate. This would result in the elected committee composed of
C \ x1 and xl.
However, two other options would be possible and can lead to different committees. The
first option would be to remove x1 and then hold a new election over the remaining
m − 1 candidates. This case will be called New Ballot (NB). The second option would
be to remove x1 and then hold a new election over the remaining m − k candidates not
in the committee C. This case will be referred to as Partial Ballot (PB). By holding
an election with all the m − 1 candidates (NB) or another election over the m − k
candidates not in the committee C (PB), the new committee can be composed of the k − 1
members of the previous committee plus another candidate without the candidate xl. This
is the definition of the Prior Successor Paradox (PSP) as given in Kamwa andMerlin (2015).
Now, suppose again that a committee C = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} of size k out of m candidates
is elected and that a candidate x1 leaves the office for some reason. By holding a new
election, the candidates whom become the new elected committee members can be totally
different in comparison with candidates in the original committee. This defines the
Leaving Member Paradox (LMP) as introduced in Staring (1986). It is obvious that this
paradox only occurs when the new election holds over the remainingm−1 candidates (NB).
Kamwa and Merlin (2015) considered the probability of these two paradoxes for the four
multi-winner voting rules presented in this paper under the IC assumption as the number
of voters tends to infinity. Using the IAC condition, we extend the results of Kamwa and
Merlin (2015) in two main directions.
First, our paper is concerned with the probability of the two paradoxes no matter the
ranking of the leaving candidate. Kamwa and Merlin (2015) started with considering the
total collective rankings over all the candidateswhich consequently provide the k committee
members. Then, given a collective ranking over the m candidates and after one candidate
is removed from the competition14, the authors are interested in the probability of each
possible collective ranking over the m − 1 candidates. On this basis, the authors studied
the probability of each paradox. More precisely, Kamwa and Merlin (2015) are concerned
in the case of m = 4 and k = 2. For X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, given that the collective ranking is
x1x2x3x4 (which means that the committee members are x1 and x2), the authors provided
two different probabilities for the PSP under NB.
PNBPSP1 = P (x2x4x3 | x̂1x2x3x4) + P (x4x2x3 | x̂1x2x3x4) (10)
PNBPSP2 = P (x1x4x3 | x1x̂2x3x4) + P (x4x1x3 | x1x̂2x3x4) (11)
14In this framework, one supposes that voters keep their preferences unchanged over the rest of candidates
no matter the candidate who leaves the elected committee.
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Under the original collective ranking x1x2x3x4 and NB, the first probability PNBPSP1 is given
when the candidate ranked first, i.e. x1, leaves (noted x̂1). The PSP will occur if the new
collective ranking over the three remaining candidates is x2x4x3 or x4x2x3 which means
that the two new elected members of the committee are x2 and x4. The second probability
PNBPSP2 is found when the candidate ranked second, i.e. x2, leaves and the PSP will occur
if the new collective ranking is x1x4x3 or x4x1x3 which means that the two new elected
members of the committee are x1 and x4.
For PB and the same original collective ranking x1x2x3x4, the first probability PPBPSP1
is given when x1 leaves and the PSP will occur if the partial election between the two
candidates not in the set C leads to the event x4Mx3, which means that the two new elected
members of the committee are x2 and x4. The second probability PPBPSP2 is given when x2
leaves and the PSP will occur if x4 beats x3 in pairwise comparison, i.e. the two new elected
members of the committee are x1 and x4.
PPBPSP1 = P (x4Mx3 | x̂1x2x3x4) (12)
PPBPSP2 = P (x4Mx3 | x1x̂2x3x4) (13)
Similarly, Kamwa and Merlin (2015) provided two different probabilities for the LMP.
The first probability PNBLMP1 is the one defined when x1 drops and the second one P
NB
LMP2
corresponds to the event when x2 leaves, given that the original collective ranking is
x1x2x3x4.
PNBLMP1 = P (x4x3x2 | x̂1x2x3x4) + P (x3x4x2 | x̂1x2x3x4) (14)
PNBLMP2 = P (x4x3x1 | x1x̂2x3x4) + P (x3x4x1 | x1x̂2x3x4) (15)
The approach described by the authors has an important limit since they do not provide the
joint probabilities of the events for each paradox15. As a consequence, the total probability
of each paradox is not provided by the authors. As mentioned previously, in our paper,
we develop an alternative representation since our probabilities are found no matter the
ranking of the leaving candidate of the original committee. By doing so, we provide the
total probability of each paradox.
The second contribution of this section is that we consider more values of k andm since we
do not only focus on the paradoxes that can occur when one wishes to select a committee
of size k = 2 out of m = 4 candidates. Kamwa and Merlin (2015) results established the
superiority of k−Borda among the four studied voting rule when one wishes tominimize the
probability of the two paradoxes. By estimating the likelihood of these paradoxes for more
values of m and k, the current section also wishes to examine whether the pre-eminence
of k−Borda will be valid again. The last purpose of the current section is to capture how
the probabilities change as a function of m and k under each voting rule. Again, while the
corresponding probabilities form = 3 andm = 4 are all exact, the ones form = 5 andm = 6
are based on computer simulations.
4.2 The prior successor paradox
In order to highlight the difference between our approach and the one developed in Kamwa
and Merlin (2015), suppose similarly that we want to elect a committee of 2 members out
15This is important since for each paradox the event describing the first probability and the second one are
not disjoint.
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of 4 candidates in the set X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. Without loss of generality, suppose that the
elected committee is C = {x1, x2} and that the prior successor is x3 which happen when
x1Sx3, x1Sx4, x2Sx3, x2Sx4, and x3Sx4 under a given voting rule S. As a consequence, in
contrast with Kamwa and Merlin (2015), we are not interested in the ranking between x1
and x216. To summarize, the event for which the elected committee is C = {x1, x2} with x3
as a prior successor requires five inequalities to be satisfied. Using the definition of a voting
situation p˜ = (p1, . . . , p24) such that
∑24
i=1 pi = 1, our first objective is to define the volume
of this space, for which we use the same general procedure of Section 3. Without loss of
generality, suppose that x1 leaves the competition and that voters keep their preferences
unchanged on the rest of candidates17 in the set X ′ = {x2, x3, x4} under NB and in the set
X ′′ = {x3, x4} under PB. Then, the PSPwill occur if the new elected two-member committee
is C = {x2, x4} which means that:
• Under NB over X ′ = {x2, x3, x4}: x2Sx3, and x4Sx3 under a given rule S.
• Under PB over X ′′ = {x3, x4}: x4Sx3 under a given S which is equivalent to x4Mx3 in
a pairwise comparison between x3 and x4.
In other words, the PSP will occur under NB (resp. PB) if and only if seven (resp. six)
inequalities are satisfied. Using the same general procedure of Section 3, we obtain
the volume of each space and the probability of the PSP of each case is provided as a
consequence of above remarks. It is obvious that for k = 1, the corresponding probabilities
will be similar for PB and NB. We denote PNBPSP (k,m) (resp. PPBPSP (k,m)), the limit
probability of the PSP for given values of k and m under NB (resp. PB) in our framework
of IAC and large electorates. The summary of our results is displayed in Tables 6-13.
Table 6: PNBPSP (k,m) for k−Plurality and
IAC∞
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.3611 0.4135 0.4221 0.4223
2 – 0.2751 0.3123 0.3443
3 – – 0.2355 0.2987
4 – – – 0.2086
Table 7: PPBPSP (k,m) for k−Plurality and
IAC∞
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.3611 0.4135 0.4221 0.4223
2 – 0.3773 0.4575 0.4754
3 – – 0.3820 0.4945
4 – – – 0.3833
16Evidently, for m = 5 and m = 6, we are not interested in the ranking neither between candidates in the
committee nor between the candidates not in the committee, with the exception of the prior successor.
17In other terms, the reduced profile defining the preferences of voters over the rest of candidates will be
unchanged in comparison with the original one, with x1 removed.
13
Table 8: PNBPSP (k,m) for k−Negative
Plurality and IAC∞
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.1233 0.2069 0.2750 0.3028
2 – 0.1582 0.2454 0.2885
3 – – 0.1836 0.2735
4 – – – 0.1890
Table 9: PPBPSP (k,m) for k−Negative
Plurality and IAC∞
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.1233 0.2069 0.2750 0.3028
2 – 0.2455 0.3722 0.3958
3 – – 0.3360 0.4774
4 – – – 0.3658
Table 10: PNBPSP (k,m) for k−Borda and
IAC∞
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.1250 0.1643 0.1731 0.1831
2 – 0.1218 0.1473 0.1676
3 – – 0.1063 0.1507
4 – – – 0.0979
Table 11: PPBPSP (k,m) for k−Borda and
IAC∞
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.1250 0.1643 0.1731 0.1831
2 – 0.1947 0.2498 0.2775
3 – – 0.2220 0.3037
4 – – – 0.2422
Table 12: PNBPSP (k,m) for Bloc and IAC∞
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.3611 0.4135 0.4221 0.4223
2 – 0.3130 0.3513 0.3923
3 – – 0.2741 0.3321
4 – – – 0.2380
Table 13: PPBPSP (k,m) for Bloc and IAC∞
m→ 3 4 5 6
k ↓
1 0.3611 0.4135 0.4221 0.4223
2 – 0.2990 0.3894 0.4434
3 – – 0.2913 0.4795
4 – – – 0.3258
Several lessons may be drawn from these probabilities.
• Our results support the superiority of k−Borda when the goal is to minimize the
probability of the PSP, with the exception of m = 3 and k = 1 where k−Negative
Plurality performs better.
• Bloc appears to be more vulnerable to the PSP than k−Plurality and k−Negative
Plurality.
• The likelihood of the PSP is lower when considering NB than PB with independence of
the analysed multi-winner voting rule.
• With NB, the probability of the PSP decreases when k increases. This fact hold with
independence of the assumed voting rule. However, we can not draw a clear conclusion
about the relationship between our probabilities and the parameter k with PB.
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4.3 The leaving member paradox
Recall the conditions for the LMP to occur. Voters use a multi-winner voting method in
order to elect a committee of size k out of m candidates in the set X. A candidate x1
drops out of the competition for some reasons. If a new election holds, a new committee
can be elected while neither of the original committee members are considered. In
other words, the new committee and the one corresponding to the original election are
disjoint. The previous observations make it clear that the LMP only occurs under NB
since, under PB, we can not end up with a committee totally different from what we
have in the original election. In addition, the LMP is clearly not defined with less than
four candidates and k greater than bm2 c, where b c stands for the integer part of the number.
Following the logic of the previous analysis, the limiting probabilities of the LMP are
found no matter the ranking of the leaving member. Again, we suppose that the reduced
preferences over the remaining candidates will be unchanged, when a candidate leaves. We
denote by PNBLMP (k,m) the probability of the LMP in our framework of IAC when n tends to
infinity. Table 14 lists these probabilities for 2 ≤ k ≤ bm2 c with 4 ≤ m ≤ 6, and the results
suggest that:
• k−Borda has a performance that is superior to the other multi-winner rules over the
range of all possible values of k and m.
• Bloc appears to exhibit extremely poor performance than k−Plurality and k−Negative
Plurality.
• For a fixed value of m, the probability of the LMP decreases significantly and eventually
tends to zero as k increases.
Table 14: PNBLMP (k,m) under IAC∞
m→ 4 5 6
k ↓
k−Plurality 2 0.0485 0.0714 0.0751
3 – – 0.0012
k−Negative Plurality 2 0.0286 0.0465 0.0667
3 – – 0.0005
k−Borda 2 0.0094 0.0144 0.0172
3 – – 0.0000
Bloc 2 0.0757 0.0891 0.1024
3 – – 0.0020
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have conducted a comparison of four multi-winner scoring rules on the
basis of two criteria. First, the ability to select the Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein
when it exists, and second the likelihood of both the prior successor paradox and the
leaving member paradox. The choice of the voting rules was guided by the fact that each
of them is based on some single-winner scoring rule. It turns out that, among all the rules
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that we consider, k−Borda performs better. It also comes from our results that, in many
cases, Bloc performs quite badly comparatively to k−Plurality and k−Negative Plurality.
Moreover, we believe that our results give a better understanding of how the likelihood of
the paradoxes change as the target size of the committee and the number of candidates vary.
As noticed in the Introduction, another generalization of a Condorcet winner to committees
is the one proposed by Fishburn (1981). In contrast to Gehrlein (1985b), there, it is
assumed that the voters have preferences over committees that satisfy certain conditions.
In particular, this approach defines a Condorcet committee as a committee that is
preferred to every other committee by a majority of voters. Notice that, Hill (1988),
Kaymak and Sanver (2003), and Kamwa and Merlin (2013) examined under which
condition a Condorcet committee in the sense of Fishburn coincide with the one in the
sense of Gehrlein. Obviously, the answer depends on the extension function used for
lifting individual preferences from alternatives to subsets. Other approaches (e.g. Brams
et al. (2006), Ratliff (2003, 2006), Elkind et al. (2011), among others) are taken in the
literature and can be considered as closely related to the problems we consider. We believe
that studying other variants of the Condorcet committee is an important research direction.
After comparing the four scoring-based rules that we consider in our paper, it is tempting
to simply study other multi-winner rules. Perhaps, a better idea would be to consider
procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one (or more) candidate in each
round, calledmulti-stage or sequential elimination voting rules. Here, we can imagine that
the process will continue to reduce the number of candidates to k candidates, the target size
of the committee. Then, the challenge would be to study the impact of multi-stage voting
on the probability of the paradoxes.
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